The turn of the twenty-first century saw the re-emergence of debates about the reconfiguration of European financial geographies and the role of stock exchange mergers in this process. There has been, however, no systematic attempt to date to analyse such changes. This paper proposes a specific conceptual framework to explore these issues. It uses a product-based analysis to examine, in the context of recent stock exchange mergers, the factors affecting the competitiveness of a financial centre. It argues that it is important to understand three intertwined influences -product complementarities, the nature of local epistemic communities, and regulation -and their contingent effects on change. This is exemplified by a tentative application of the framework to the case of Amsterdam in order to better understand its recent decline in competitiveness as a European financial centre.
largest investment banks and is deeply embedded in the organizational entrails of these firms, allowing for highly valuable trade between anonymous 'others' who share the birthmarks of the organizations of which they are part (Clark and Thrift 2005) . These firms also have intense relationships with a range of other advanced producer services (in particular accountants, lawyers and financial information providers) that act as essential intermediaries in financial transactions. Consequently, leading IFCs such as London and New York, where these financial conglomerates have their (head) offices -primarily for historical reasons -, continue to remain hubs of financial activities because of their agglomerations of financial institutions and supporting producer services and the benefits brought to them in terms of both the timeliness of services and ability to convey tacit advice and consolidate important inter-firm relationships (Beaverstock et al. 2000; Faulconbridge 2007; Sassen 2000; Thrift 1987 ). However, while urban concentration was crucial for financial liquidity before virtualization, the advantages of concentration seem to have shifted in today's screen-based environment. Instead, the presence of a sufficient number of knowledgeable clients and suppliers with which to conduct ever more complex and sophisticated bespoke trades seems important today, something which leads us to our second point.
• Localization advantages: finance has always been an industry where the knowledge of traders has had a direct influence on profitability, something that is even further amplified by the increased complexity of contemporary financial products (Thrift 1994; Tickell 2000) . The clustering of financial institutions within IFCs leads to what has been described as 'information spillovers' (Porteous 1999) or 'buzz' (Storper and Venables 2004) . This is the process of knowledge creation and dispersion that is facilitated by the relatively tight spatial matrix within which financial institutions locate themselves in leading IFCs (e.g. The City and Canary Wharf in London, South Manhattan in New York, 'das Bankenviertel' in Frankfurt), and the dense social interactions between traders within these matrices (Thrift 1994; Corporation of London 2003) . Being embedded within such spaces of knowledge production and dispersion appears to be essential for conducting profitable trades. As studies in the sociology of finance have shown (Abolafia 2004; Beunza and Stark 2004; Zaloom 2003) , decision making and actions in financial markets cannot be disassociated from the interactions within the trading room, and more widely within the local financial community.
However, it is increasingly debated whether that actually requires physical proximity and whether other forms of proximity -social, cultural, organizational -do not suffice (Allen 2002; Amin and Cohendet 2004; Beaverstock 2006; Faulconbridge 2006; Grote et al. 2002) .
The implications of this, whilst contested (Clark et al. 2006; Gertler 2003) , are potentially significant and may force a reconceptualization of the nature of localization advantages.
• Institutional and regulatory advantage: whilst some have suggested this is of declining influence (e.g. Budd 1999), it is argued here that the regulatory institutions influencing IFCs are as pertinent as ever (see also Clark 2002; Corporation of London 2003) . Without wanting to become entangled in debates about the rolling back or otherwise of the nation state, it seems that regulatory influences continue to provide advantages to some centres and disadvantages to others. The example of the Bund-future market, primarily based on German federal bonds, but initially traded and regulated in London because of the prevention of derivatives trading in Germany until 1990, illustrates such an argument (Laulajainen 2001) . After reregulation the Bund-future market moved to Frankfurt because of the advantages of the German electronic trading system, especially its cost-efficiency. However, this resulted in an interesting form of spatial organization and specialization. The exchange was based and regulated in Germany, but traders continued to be almost exclusively located in London as the 'epistemic knowledge community' exists there and the 'localization' advantages described above 'fix' traders in the City (Lo and Grote 2003) . Other examples are the successes of Dublin and Luxembourg to attract an increasing number of hedge funds and other money managers by lax establishment rules and competitive fiscal systems (Hardie and MacKenzie 2006) . Even more topical are the worries voiced by the British financial establishment about a future merger of the LSE with Nasdaq, currently one of its largest shareholders, over the possibility that the LSE would come to fall under the over restrictive regulation of the SEC (Financial Times 2006a) . Similarly, the growing share of international IPO's going to London's LSE and AIM instead of New York's NYSE is largely the effect of prohibitive corporate governance regulation under the US Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (The Economist 2006) . Hence, it is fair to conclude that even in a neoliberal world, regulatory differences can still play a role in explaining the differential distribution of financial activities over space.
The 'end of geography', then, is far from nigh in the European financial system. The introduction of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the virtualization of trade are not going to wipe the historically pre-structured slate of finance clean. Hence, technological extrapolations are unable to explain the present nor do they allow an easy reading off of the future pattern of the geographically uneven 'pools' of financial activity from current distributions of capital. Similarly, the location and organizational form of stock exchanges are not proxies for market location and IFC construction (Clark 2005b) . Consequently, it is increasingly important to ground analyses of European (and global) financial geographies in a closer understanding of the wider contexts that create sticky and, at the same time, shifting geographies. To do this, we need a conceptualization of finance that is not preloaded towards one of the three explanatory variables mentioned above but is catholic enough to encompass all three of them. We surmise that a focus on financial products, and the associated market conditions and knowledge communities that facilitate their development and trading, as suggested by Clark and O'Connor (1997) , is up to this task.
Since financial products are about prices, risks and (future) streams of income as well as the external conditions impinging on these variables, they are pre-eminently about information.
As such, a focus on products and the information they contain clearly covers the epistemic community dimension of the explanatory template. Moreover, since knowledge and information differ with regard to the extent in which they are in need of interpretation, a focus on the informational content of different financial products allows us to determine the importance of physical proximity to both clients and suppliers with regard to different financial transactions and hence to explain their spatial distribution.
The institutional dimension impinges on this in at least two ways. First, in determining the size of the domestic financial industry and the depth of public financial markets. Since the liquidity of financial markets is institutionally determined, the quality and quantity of available financial products is too. If there is a large amount of domestic capital available for investment in equity and bond markets, as is generally the case in political economies with funded pension systems, financial markets tend to be deeper and hence more transparent than is the case in political economies with pay-as-you-go pension systems (Verdier 2002; Clark 2003) . Second, in affecting the extent to which financial regulation, corporate governance law and securities law do conform to what is increasingly seen as the international standard, namely British or American regulatory conventions. This latter, more direct dimension of institutional determination covers everything from the entrance criteria of public stock markets, to the accountancy rules concerning the consolidation of pension assets and liabilities (Véron et al. 2006) , and the legal protections provided to minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998; . This influences the locational decision-making of leading traders and investors. As such, a product perspective allows us to track shifts over time in the composition of the type of trade conducted in specific IFCs and relate these to stock exchange reconfigurations and changes in the underlying variables just mentioned.
Note, however, that while clearly implicating path dependent explanations of the current distribution of finance over space, our conceptualization of institutional 'effects' is more about the managed 'reproduction' (or, as is the case in Amsterdam: the failure to do so) of financial advantages and disadvantages than about the 'origins' of these advantages and disadvantages. Both are related, but different, and the two parts need to be kept distinct in order to avoid the fallacy of functionalism (explaining the genesis of a particular arrangement from its current function) or the a-historical terra nullius-assumption of much of neoclassical economics (see Mahoney 2000) . We emphatically do not want to suggest that the empirical field of finance is not historically pre-structured. Hence, the distribution of transparent products will not be random, as the 'end of geography' thesis maintains, but will tend to 'flow' to historically determined pools of capital and, in particular, those IFCs that reproduce themselves in an attractive manner in the contemporary era. The paper does not pretend to provide an historical explanation of the genesis of specific geographical pools of finance but takes the historically determined distribution of capital over space as an empirical given. 1 This historical substrate is, then, used as a starting point for considering contemporary trends and informs analysis of the present day influences on the geographical dynamics of finance. Before visiting the case of Amsterdam in order to exemplify this argument, we first briefly summarize Clark and O'Connor's framework and its usefulness in guiding this type of analysis.
Geographies of 'Sticky' Financial Products
According to Clark and O'Connor (1997) , the localization of trading in transparent financial products is primarily determined by price considerations and hence by 'economies of scale'.
Knowledge of the underlying entity (firm, commodity, real estate, infrastructure, etc) is unimportant, as the controlling variables determining the price of property rights are highly standardized, instantly available and hardly in need of insider interpretations. Consequently, trade in these types of products, which consists mostly of simple buy/sell transactions, can take place anywhere, with concentration normally occurring in centres such as London and New York because of the critical mass of traders present (and therefore the reduction in costs and a high level of liquidity offered). Trade in commodities, FX-trade as well as in 'blue chip' stocks of large internationally renowned firms and guilt-edged bonds are obvious examples of financial products that form the backbone of international financial trade and as such have increasingly become global assets that do no longer provide co-located traders with proximity advantages. Since these types of assets have increasingly become global assets, the information on which their prices are dependent does no longer serve as a criterion to distinguish insiders and outsiders.
[ Table 1 . about here ]
The intermediate category consists of translucent products. These are variations on well known global products that use local mutations to create a geographically and temporarily unique product. As a result, the knowledge needed to trade in such products and the risk associated with them is unclear to those outside the market, yet is not exclusively local in a strict sense. A small investment to gain insight into the product may allow it to be traded without physical presence in the long term. Clark and O'Connor (1997: 97) acknowledge that the translucent category often blurs with the transparent and opaque ones. As such, this intermediate category bridges the completely transparent and the completely opaque. While hard to identify and delineate clearly, it is our contention that within the contemporary financial landscape, those financial agents who are able to render transparent products (partially) opaque (e.g. hedge funds) and opaque products partially transparent (e.g. private equity funds) have become increasingly important for large institutional investors looking for (quasi)bespoke products that fit their highly idiosyncratic risk and return profiles, and have come to determine by and by the dynamism on which vital IFCs rely. Hence, if nothing else, localization advantages and regulation can ensure such competitive advantage is gained.
Trade in opaque financial products, by definition, takes place in close proximity to the actors who have a thorough knowledge of the underlying entity. There is a deep information asymmetry in the sense that traders have no way of fully understanding the variables controlling fluctuations in a product's price, something that can only be overcome by developing strong relationships both with those who 'design' the product and those with experience of its trading.
Private equity exemplifies this category, but so do the small and mid cap sections of public exchanges. Since changes in the underlying variables impinging on the price of the property titles largely occur outside the radar screens of the international analysts, different means of access to crucial information are needed in order to be a successful trader. Here proximity and access to relevant epistemic communities becomes crucial. Outsiders lacking these avenues of access are dependent on local 'gatekeepers' in order to be able to trade in these opaque financial categories.
At the same time, regulation determines whether such innovative products can be accommodated.
As table 1 highlights, one result of the differing informational content of each product type is, according to Clark and O'Connor's (1997) analytical framework, a product-specific spatial distribution of financial activities over different IFCs, which neither conforms to the strong 'end of geography' claim nor to the 'neo-marshallian' world of Amin and Thrift (1992) inter-linkages between the three product categories and the three-pronged influence of agglomeration, localization and regulation on processes of change over time. We argue that the changing geography of financial products is a result of inter-relationships between all three product categories and that, in particular, transparent and opaque products are interlinked with their geographies being mutually dependent and not exclusive.
Changing Financial Geographies: The Case of Amsterdam

Sustainable Growth?
As a historical financial centre that once ruled the international financial world, Amsterdam has succeeded in weathering many fateful shifts and turns (see Barbour 1976; Riley 1980; Schama 1987; Neal 1990; Braudel 1982; Cassis 2006) . During the 1980s, the Amsterdam financial community was well positioned to jump the bandwagon of the financial boom that started with the demise of 'embedded liberalism' in the mid-1970s (Ruggie 1982; Helleiner 1994 ). Compared to the 1960s and 1970s when annual turnover of trade in equities and bonds at the Amsterdam stock exchange ranged form EUR 4,5 billion to EUR 8,7 billion and EUR 1,2 billion to EUR 9,7 billion respectively for shares and bonds, during the 1980s levels of EUR 83 billion were reached for shares and EUR 90 billion for bonds (CBS 2006a) A third, organizational, innovation within the world of stock exchanges was undertaken in 1996 when the Paris Bourse and the Brussels and Amsterdam exchanges announced that they would integrate their (virtual) order books and would adopt the Parisian trading system in order to pool their respective liquidities, which were considered to be too small to withstand the increasing centrifugal force of the London Stock Exchange. Euronext, as the product of the merger was christened, is at the moment of writing still the only truly transnational stock exchange. While the value of average daily trading of the combined exchanges of Euronext in 1990 added up to only $ 170 billion, turning them into the 8 th largest exchange worldwide, currently Euronext is the 5 th largest exchange in terms of average daily turnover (after, respectively, the NYSE, Nasdaq, the LSE and the Tokyo exchanges), the 6 th largest exchange in terms of market capitalization (after, respectively, the NYSE, Tokyo, Nasdaq, the LSE and the Osaka exchanges), and the 8 th largest in terms of number of listed firms (after, respectively, the Bombay, Toronto, Nasdaq, LSE, NYSE, Tokyo and Korean exchanges) (WFE 2006) . This, again, clearly demonstrates the importance of pooled liquidity for the operational success of an exchange organization in a context of financial market integration. Finally the failure to develop a viable community of traders in translucent products suggests that there are interaction effects at work between the different product types and their respective trading communities, which can explain both success and failure in reproducing financial advantages.
Accounting for Decline
The questions raised by this case can be reconsidered in several ways. Nevertheless, on the basis of the material available we can plausibly suggest that the 'local' knowledge which used to be opaque to outsiders and which provided a monopolistic niche for local, intermediary agents is decreasingly so. Due to increases in computing powers, Understanding this dynamic is vital and leads us to our second argument.
The effect of the inability of Amsterdam's financial community to reproduce 'opaque' financial products needs exploring. The 1990s have seen an enormous increase in the importance of complex financial products, consisting of an assemblage of financial assets with different risk, return and liquidity profiles. These are demanded by highly sophisticated institutional investors and their intermediaries in order to reap returns over and above those provided by more mainstream (transparent) assets. At the most cutting edge of this type of financial trading are both the large international financial institutions and the 'new' communities of 'boutiques' and 'hedge funds', which increasingly mimic the organizational structure of the film and advertising industry and the 'project ecologies' in which these are embedded (Grabher 2004; Hall 2006; The Economist 2006) . Both in these boutiques and in the larger financial institutions, the networks and expertise of individuals are used to maximise profit from complex financial transactions.
Such an ecology requires both a circumscribed arena where these professionals can first learn the trade and subsequently built up a network of collaborators, meet other investors and look for sophisticated customers. As the lack of a viable hedge fund community in Amsterdam indicates, these conditions were either absent or had been eroded too much to sustain the sort of epistemic exchange from which financial innovation springs forth. This raises two questions. First, whether the absence of traders in translucent products was primarily due to a decline in opaque products or, alternatively, in transparent products. In other words, is the future viability of smaller scale IFCs primarily dependent on the presence of agents that can mediate between outsiders and local opaque products (gatekeepers) or on the presence of traders who can transform transparent products into translucent, higher rewarding ones? 
Discussion and Conclusions: Interpreting the Influences on European Financial
Geographies This paper has argued that there is much that remains to be done in order to fully understand the complex dynamics of European financial geographies and the changing roles of the multiple IFCs in Europe. In particular, by drawing on studies of the effects of the virtualization of stock exchanges on financial geographies and the importance of epistemic 'infrastructures' for financial activities, it has shown that the spatial distribution of activities within the new international financial system is, in many ways, inherently linked to both the characteristics and relative strengths and weaknesses of different financial centres but also to the relational networks that tie centres together and into wider global financial networks.
In doing so, the analysis has in some ways echoed previous research focussing upon London's changing role in European finance (Beaverstock et al. 2005; Clark 2002; Faulconbridge 2004; Thrift 2000) . All of these studies have noted the importance of London's competitive urban infrastructure, regulation and global interconnectivity and their effects upon the city's sustenance as a leading IFC both within Europe and globally. They have also argued that 'product complementarities' and the prevalence of knowledge-intensive, 'sticky' financial products in London are integral to the city's continued growth.
What this paper has offered to further this cause, however, is a deeper foray into the complex world of financial products and their complementarities, which emphasizes the interdependencies between transparent, translucent and opaque products and the way liquidity, innovation and regulation are at the centre of these relationships. This has allowed us to identify the intricate linkages between different categories of financial products and the potential for feedback mechanisms that impact upon an IFCs long term sustenance and growth within global relational networks. The case of Amsterdam has revealed that the vibrancy of an IFC is determined by the skill and the number of its opaque and translucent traders, but that these, in turn, are crucially related to an underlying 'infrastructure' that has been able to pool large 'chunks' of capital -something that London possesses in abundance.
In this regard the upshot is that transparency, and hence liquidity, is not a given but is actively 'produced', as is demonstrated by the 'construction' of an international real estate market through the commodification of so-called 'mortgage-backed securities' (see Carruthers and Stinchcome 1999; Gotham 2006) . Far from falsifying the explanatory adequacy of the productinformation based framework used in this paper, the 'plasticity' of the categories, which, if our analysis is correct, is crucial for understanding the fate of different financial centres, can only be made visible on the basis of a typology of different ideal types such as the Clark and O'Connor one. In this we merely follow Max Weber's prescriptions. Our categories should be understood as theoretical conceptualizations of a complex and layered social reality which allow us to focus on the discrepancies between the two -ideal type and empirical observations -in order to provide adequate explanations for these empirical 'anomalies' (Weber 1972: 3; Swedberg 1998: 193-4 Connor (1997: 96-99 ).
